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ABSTRACT 
This paper looks at the rule against disclosure, together with 
some of its exceptions, as set out in rule 11 of the Health 
Information Code 1994, and compares it with the legal position in 
New Zealand prior to the Privacy Act 1993 and the above mentioned 
Code. The object is to determine whether or not the Code has made 
a difference, and if so, to what extent. 
The paper shows that the Code reflects the existing law with 
regard to confidentiality of "health information", and that there 
are only a few minor additions to the law as it was before. The 
cone l usi on is reached that even though the Code has not made 
significant changes to the law with regard to the disclosure of 
"health information", it has made a considerable difference by 
having the legal position clearly set out in a statutory 
document, and by being backed by the Complaints Procedure of the 
Privacy Act. An unlawful disclosure of "health information" can 
now easily be redressed, whereas this was not previously the 
case. 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes, and 
bibliography) comprises approximately 14,600 words. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
The Privacy Act 1993 came into force on 1 July 1993 and has as one 
of its main purposes the promotion and protection of individual 
privacy in general accordance with the 1980 OECD Guidelines on the 
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flow of Personal Data. 1 
Shortly after the enactment of the Privacy Act 1993, a temporary 
code2 concerning health information was released. The Health 
Information Privacy Code 1994 (hereinafter called "the Code") 
replaced the temporary code in late 1994 and provides stringent 
controls on the collection, use and disclosure of medical and health 
information by agencies within the health sector. The code was issued 
at the Commissioner's own initiative3 because he was aware of the 
urgent need of an early emphasis on privacy in the health and 
disability sector. 4 It has been recognised that health information 
is a particularly sensitive type of information for which there was 
only haphazard protection under (previously) existing legislation and 
professional ethics. 5 
The Code covers the same ground as the Information Privacy Principles 
in the Privacy Act. In some respects the obligations under the Code 
are more stringent than those in the Information Privacy Principles. 
At the heart of the Code are 12 "health information privacy rules" 
B Slane "Update on the Impact of Privacy on Medicine and the Law" Address by the 
Privacy Commissioner to Second Annual Medi co-Legal Conference, 20 April 1994 , 
Auckland, in Health Information & Privacy in New Zealand . A Campi lation of Health 
Information-related Materials on the Privacy Act 1993 and the Office of the 
Privacy Commissioner July 1992-May 1995 (Auckland, 1995) 52 . 
Codes of practice can be issued under Part VI of the Privacy Act 1993 . 
Sees 46 of the Privacy Act 1993 . 
B Slane "Health Information, Privacy, Confidentiality and Medical Ethics" Address 
by the Privacy Commissioner at the Wellington School of Medicine, 9 February 1994 , 
in Health Information & Privacy in New Zealand 26 . 
"Changes to Privacy of Information Bill",22.3.93 i n Privacy : New Zealand . A 
Compilation of Materials on the Privacy Act 1993 and the Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner Val Two February 1994 to December 1994 (Auckland,1995) 246. 
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(together with 11 operative clauses) which replace the 12 Privacy 
Principles of the Privacy Act. Each rule refers to "health 
information" and "health agency" and therefore only applies to health 
agencies and only to those agencies in their dealings with health 
information. In their dealings with non health type personal 
information (such as employee information) health agencies will have 
to be aware of obligations under the more general Information Privacy 
Priciples. 6 
The Code is embedded, as it were, in the Privacy Act and must 
therefore be read together with other parts of the Act that are 
relevant to health information. 7 The complaints procedure, for 
example, which is set out in Part VIII of the Act, is crucial when 
a rule of the Code has been breached. 
Rule 11 of the Code is entitled "Limits on Disclosure of Health 
Information" and deals with the right of an individual to control the 
disclosure of his or her own health information to third parties. 
Rule 11 is one of the more important rules, and the one that departs 
to the greatest degree from Principle 11 in the Privacy Act. It is 
also the longest rule and has the greatest number of exceptions. 8 
Prior to the Privacy Act and the Health Information Privacy Code, the 
obligation upon doctors9 not to disclose (or to disclose) information 
about patients, was governed by medical professional ethics, 
legislation, and by the common law. 
The purpose of this paper is to consider various aspects of the 
disclosure of health information, and, by examining both rule 11 of 
the Health Information Privacy Code (and any other, relevant 
B Slane "What you must know about privacy" Address by the Privacy Commissioner to 
the Hea 1 th Sector Risk Management Conference, Auck 1 and, 19 October 1993 in Hea 1 th 
Information & Privacy in New Zealand 19. 
Some of these parts are printed as an appendix to the Code . Extracts from Part 
VIII, however, are not included . 
"Beyond the Temporary Code" in Health Information & Privacy in New Zealand 72. 
This obligation did not apply exclusively to doctors and could also apply to other 
health professionals and health workers . 
10 
11 
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provisions of the Code or the Privacy Act 1993) and medical 
confidentiality as it existed prior to the Code, to determine whether 
the Code has in fact made a difference, and if so, to what extent. 
The length of this paper precludes a detailed discussion of all the 
exceptions listed under rule 11(2), and for this reason some of them 
have deli berate l y been omitted, in order to concentrate on those that 
would more easily be associated with confidentiality prior to the 
enactment of the Code. lO 
II TO WHOM DOES CONFIDENTIALITY APPLY? 
A Health Agencies Bound by the Code 
The term "health agency" is defined in clause 3(1) by cross-reference 
to clause 4(2), which sets out the "agencies" to whom the code 
applies. The main agencies are those providing health and disability 
services. Many of these agencies will be health professionals, both 
registered and unregistered who provide health services or disability 
services. Under this heading are also Crown Health Enterprises (CHEs) 
and other licensed hospitals, ambulance services, old people's homes 
and the blood transfusion service11 • Employees of such agencies are 
also included. Other classes of agencies include purchasers of health 
services (such as the RHAs, and the Public Health Commission), and 
the Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Corporation 
(ACC). Clause 3(1) has been added to the definition in clause 4(2), 
namely that for the purposes of rule 11 a health agency that no 
longer provides health and disability services is included, as well 
as the personal representative of a health agency (being a natural 
person) who at the time of his death held any health information. The 
net is cast very wide: one could probably safely say that anyone who 
comes into contact with the health information of an identifiable 
The following exceptions have been omitted: rule 11(2)(a); (c);(e);(f);(g); (h) and 
(k) . The writer also admits that the exceptions chosen for discussion represented 
a personal choice of those which seemed to be more important or more interesting . 
It is felt that a discussion of those that were omitted would not have changed the 
conclusion that is ultimately reached . 
Commentary to the Code 7 . 
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individual in the scope of his or her employment or volunteer 
service, or is still in possession of such information, would be 
considered an agency for the purposes of the Code. 
8 Persons to whom Confidentiality Previously Applied 
Prior to the Privacy Act and the Code confidentiality with regard to 
health information applied particularly, but not exclusively, to 
doctors. They were (and still are) bound by professional ethical 
codes 12 , and may also have had statutory13 and common law
14 duties 
not to disclose such information. Other health professionals, such 
as psychologists, nurses, dentists and physiotherapists, may also 
have been bound by their respective professional ethical codes
15 , as 
we 11 as having possible statutory and common law duties not to 
disclose information. Other health workers and employees who, in the 
scope of their employment or volunteer service, came into contact 
with the health information of identifiable individuals, may also 
have had a duty of keeping such information confidential, but only 
if a statutory16 requirement applied to them, or if confidentiality 
was a term of their employment contract, or if they were bound by a 
common law duty17 . The doctrine of vicarious liability would also 
have found application in this context, so that an employee of a 
health professional, such as a receptionist, would also have been 
bound by the duty to keep information confidential. 
See below part VI B. 
See below part VI C. 
See below part VI D 1-6 . 
See, for example, the Nursing Council of New Zeal and' s "Code of Conduct for Nurses 
and Midwives" January 1995, principle 3.4, which deals with conf i dentiality . 
See above part VI C 2. Confidentiality applied to the employees of the 
institutions to which the Hospitals Act 1957 and the Area Health Boards Act 19B3 
related. 
The most obvious example would be where a fiduciary relationship could be 
established. See part VI D 5. 
18 
6 
Prior to the Code there could possibly have been persons who, 
although they would now be classified as "health agencies" by the 
Code, were not under any duty not to disclose the health information 
of an identifiable individual. The Code has ensured that no one who 
deals with the health information of identifiable individuals in the 
scope of his or her profession, employment, or volunteer service is 
omitted from the category of "health agencies". 
Ill CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION 
The Code is concerned with a wide range of information or classes of 
information about an identifiable individual. Clause 4(1) sets out 
exactly what health information includes. Health information is 
divided into five groups. The first four include the following: 
information about the health, medical history, disabilities of and 
hea 1 th and di sabi 1 i ty services provided for that i ndi vi dual, or 
information derived from the testing or examination of any body part 
or any bodily substance of that individual. The fifth group consists 
of information about that individual which is collected before or in 
the course of, and incidental to, the provision of any health or 
disability service to that individual. 
Prior to the Code information which would have been considered as 
confidential in the context of medical confidentiality would have 
been covered by the first four groups listed in clause 4(1). This 
would have included information on patient records, namely 
information given orally by the patient, information given by others, 
information generated by the doctor from his own obsevervation 
(diagnosis and prognosis), and information acquired from X-rays, 
pathology tests etc. 18 However, the fifth category mentioned above, 
namely information about that individual which is collected before, 
or in the course of, and incidental to the provision of any health 
or disability service to that individual, expands t~e scope of health 
information that was previously considered as confidential. It means, 
J M Jacob "Confident i a 1 i ty: the Danger of Anything Weaker than the Medi ea 1 Ethic" 
(1982) 8 Journal of Medical Ethics 18 . 
19 
20 
21 
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in effect, that information such as an individual's name, address, 
telephone number, ethnicity, religion and billing information is 
included here. 
Should a doctor now wish to disclose a patient's name, address and 
billing information to a debt collector, or warn another doctor that 
a patient is a bad debtor, these disclosures will have to meet the 
requirements of rule 11, seeing that such information is included in 
"health information". 
Information such as religion and membership of RSA which, until 
recently, was routinely collected on admission forms of patients at 
hospitals and then disclosed to enable chaplains 19 and volunteer 
workers to visit these patients, are examples of such "incidental" 
information. The Code and a general awareness of privacy issues have 
led to a change in such procedures. Admission forms now inform 
patients of the purpose for which information such as religion is 
being collected20 and enable patients to indicate whether they wish 
this information to be disclosed to the relevant chaplains. 
IV DECEASED PERSONS 
An individual is defined by the Privacy Act 1993 as meaning "a 
natural person other than a deceased natural person 1121 • Clause 4(1) 
of the Code provides only that the Code applies to "an identifiable 
individual". Rule 11, however, makes it clear that the rule 
concerning disclosure applies equally to living and deceased 
individuals. Subrules 1(a)(ii) and 1(b)(ii) of rule 11 use the words 
"where the individual is dead", and subrule 5 provides that "this 
rule applies to health information about living or deceased 
persons .. " Subrule 6 further states that rule 11 "applies to health 
"Issues Paper no 1: Hospital Chaplains and Health Information" in Health 
In-formation & Privacy in New Zealand 124. 
See rule 3(1)(a)-(c) of the Code . 
Section 2. 
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information about any identifiable deceased person, for not more than 
20 years after the day of that person's death". 
This subrule reflects the traditional ethical principle stated by the 
British General Medical Council (GMC)'s Blue BooJ!2, paragraph 91: 
The fact of a patient's death does not of itself release a doctor from the 
obligation to maintain confidentiality . 
This principle is echoed in the NZMA's revised Code of Ethics of 1989 
which mentions that it is a principle of ethical behaviour to 
"protect the patient's secrets, even after his or her death 11 • 23 
In 1984, Stephen Lock, editor of the British Medical Journal, 
discussed the position of disclosures about the health of public 
figures and historical documents. 24 After receiving a letter from the 
GMC noting that an obituary notice had disclosed confidential medical 
information about the late General Orde Wingate whose cerebral 
malaria had led to an attempt at suicide, the GMC emphasised that the 
death of the patient did not absolve the doctor from the obligation 
of confidentiality. Lock's reaction was to defend medical journalists 
and historians, quoting Lord Moran's disclosures about the health of 
Winston Churchill . 25 The GMC finally agreed that it was not improper 
to reproduce information already "on the record" in books or in court 
proceedings. 
Prior to the Code the legal position, apart from this ethical 
principle, was not altogether clear. Kennedy and Grubb26 point out 
ProFessional Conduct: Fitness to Practise (February 1991). 
D Collins Medical Law in New Zealand (Brooker & Friend Ltd , Wellington, 1992) 3 . 
D Cole Medi ea I Practice and Pro Fess i ona I Conduct in New Zea I and (School of 
Medicine, Auckland,1988) 21-22. 
Lord Moran, in a biography of Church i 11, disclosed details of the strokes ana · 
other illnesses which he suffered while in office. See IE Thompson "The Nature of 
Confidentiality" (1979) 5 Journal oF Medical Ethics 60. 
I Kennedy and A Grubb Medi ea I Law: Text with Mater i a Is ( 2 ed, Butterworths, London, 
1994) 643. 
27 
28 
29 
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that the crucial question is whether the right to have informat i on 
kept confidential is a right which passes as a chose in act i on to the 
estate. However, there seems to be no case law on this point. 
Rule 11(5) of the Code confirms the ethical rule, namely that the 
disclosure of health information of deceased individuals should be 
treated in the same way as that of living individuals. The limitation 
of 20 years after an individual's death (subrule (6)) represents an 
addition to the ethical rule, as no such limitation existed before. 
One should note, however, that the disclosure of information about 
public or well known figures may well be permissible without the 
consent of the individual, under subrule (1)(d), namely that the 
source of the information is a "publicly available publication". 
V CHILDREN 
A Children, Disclosure and Representatives in the Code 
The Privacy Act 1993 defines "individual" merely as "a natural 
person" and does not make specific reference to children. 27 The same 
applies to the Code. The implication is that children are to enjoy 
equal rights of privacy with adults. Rule 11(4)(b)(i) and (ii) 
provide that a health agency, when requested to disclose information 
by a representative of an i ndi vi dual in terms of the Hea 1th Act 
section 22F(1) 28 , may refuse to disclose such health information to 
the representative if the disclosure would be contrary to the 
i ndi vi dual 's interests or the agency has reasonable grounds for 
believing that the individual does not or would not wish the 
information to be disclosed. 29 The Code defines the "representative" 
S 2 . See also "United Nat i ons Convention on the Ri ght s o f t h e Ch il d : Initial 
Comments from the Office of the Privacy Commissioner" i n Pri va cy: New Zealand 98 . 
This section provides that information must be disclosed upon the request of the 
i ndi vi dual about whom the information i s held , or a representative of that 
individual or any other person who is providing or about to prov i de health or 
disability services to that individual . 
A typical example of such a refusal would be i n the case of ch i ld abuse or sexual 
abuse, where the information may reflect badly on the parent or careg i ver . 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
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of an individual under the age of 16 years to be his or her parent 
or guardian. 30 This definition is incons i stent with the Guardianship 
Act 1968 which provides that guardians have the authority to make 
medical decisions on behalf of children under 16 who are not capable 
of making their own decisions. The Code uses the alternative concept 
of "parent" whi eh is not synonomous with that of a guardian. Parents 
do not always have legal rights to control the upbringing of a 
child. 31 This inconsistency complicates a situation which is already 
fraught with difficulties. 
Subrule 2(b) 32 of rule 11 provides that health information may be 
disclosed if disclosure is "by a registered health professional ... to 
the principal caregiver or a near relative of the individual 
concerned in accordance with recognised professi anal practice and the 
disclosure is not contrary to the express request of the individual". 
This implies that a child of any age may veto disclosure. It has been 
reported that in 1994 Middlemore Hospital decided not to tell a 
mother about her 14 year old daughter's miscarriage on the basis that 
to do so would be a breach of the Privacy Act. The parents were 
critical of the decision but the hospital respected the capacity of 
the 14 year old to be treated as an independent person with 
independent rights of privacy. 33 In connection with this case the 
Privacy Commissioner commented that doctors have always had their own 
code of ethics and "have not always revealed all information about 
children under 16 to their parents". 34 
In a draft paper, Privacy Issues and Patient Records35, the NZMA has 
the following to say on the subject: 
Clause 3(1) . 
M Henaghan "Ch i ldren and Privacy" Address at Pri v a c y Is s u es Fo rum 1995 , 
Wellington, 29 June 1995 , 5. 
See below part VII B 1. 
Above n 31 , 4 . 
"Privacy Laws Just Commonsense: Slane" , in Health Information & Privacy i n Ne w 
Zea land 88 . 
1995 . 
36 
37 
38 
11 
Children Also Have A Right To Privacy 
Wh ile a parent or guardian has no general right of access to their (sic) 
children's medical records, a medical practitioner can disclose health 
information on receiving a request from a pa rent or guardian where that 
information is required to prov ide the child with health services. Med ical 
practitioners must however have regard to the express wis hes of the c h ild 
concerned. Information must be disclosed only to a nominated person or 
principle care-giver ...... . 
Neither the Code nor the above comments of the NZMA solve the dilemma 
a doctor would find himself in if a young child does not wish health 
information to be disclosed to a parent or guardian. The only 
guideline seems to be the age of 16 years. The Health Act 1956 has 
been amended so that section 22C(3) now provides that for the 
purposes of principle 11(d) of the Privacy Act 1993, the disclosure 
of health information about an individual may be authorised by that 
individual personally, if he or she has attained the age of 16 years 
(or by a representative of that individual). This does not solve the 
problem of how old children younger than 16 years should be in order 
to deny parents access to health information about themselves. It 
was hoped that the Privacy Commissioner would address this issue in 
the permanent code36 , but this was evidently not the case. 
B The Law with Regard to Children's Decisions 
As long as a child is prima facie incompetent to form a relationship 
of confidentiality, the welfare of such a child is best served by 
others coming to know what the doctor has learned. Ordinarily it will 
be the parents who need to know so as to care for their child~. This 
concept of parental autonomy is widely accepted~, and in the face 
of this, a doctor would need very strong reasons for not disclosing 
what has been learned. The "best interests" of the child will 
H Patterson "Doctors Come to Grips with Privacy Code" in Health Information & 
Privacy in New Zealand 25. 
Above n 26, 641. 
J K Mason and R A McCa 11 Smith Law and Medi ea 1 Ethics ( Butterworths , London, 1963) 
102 . 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
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therefore create a strong presumption ,n favour of disclosure. 39 
The moral dilemma about disclosure occurs when dealing with a child 
who has the capacity both to consent to treatment and to enter into 
a confidential relationship. Kennedy and Grubb40 are of the opinion 
that a breach of confidence may be justified if the doctor can show 
that disclosure is in the "best interests" of the child. There is, 
however, no statutory duty in New Zealand to disclose to parents.
41 
As mentioned above, the dilemma facing a doctor would occur when a 
child below the age of sixteen requires advice or treatment but does 
not wish his/her parents to be informed. Issues such as pregnancy or 
contraception, and more recently, AIDS, would be good examples. 
In GUlick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority42
 the 
Court of Appeal in England held that a girl under 16 could not give 
valid consent to contraceptive treatment without her parents' 
consent, and ruled that a circular issued by the Department of Health 
and Social Security to the Area Health Authorities to the effect that 
a doctor consulted by a girl under 16 would be acting lawfully if he 
prescribed contraceptives to the girl, was too liberal. This decision 
was reversed by the House of Lords. 43 As a result of this decision, 
the GMC revised its guidance to doctors, to the effect that if the 
doctor is satisfied that the child has the maturity and ability to 
understand, and the child refuses to allow a parent or such other 
person to be told, the doctor must decide, in the patient's best 
medical interest, whether or not to offer advice or treatment, and 
whether or not to disclose the information learned from the 
Above n 26, 641 . 
Above n 26, 642. 
Above n 31, 19 . 
(1985] 1 All ER 533 (CA) . 
[ 1985] 3 All ER 402 . See above n 24, 24. 
44 
45 
46 
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consul tat i on44 . 
The guidance by the GMC is in keeping wi th good medical ethics as i t 
indicates that the obligation of confidence comes into existence in 
the case of a competent child - one who is capable of exercising 
autonomy. In the case of a competent young girl, her parents are 
third parties and she may legally exercise control over the 
information she gives to the doctor by binding him to secrecy . In the 
case of an incompetent young girl, her parents can exercise control 
over information whi eh the doctor learns from her, i n that way, on 
her behalf, and can prevent him from disseminating it to third 
parties, such as the press. This right to control arises from the 
more general right which parents have so as to be able to carry out 
the duties they have to their children. In this case, the duty is to 
protect the child's privacy and welfare 45 . 
The common law position is therefore that a child's capacity to 
understand the nature of the decision is the determining factor, and 
not a particular age. 
Article 12 of the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, which New Zealand ratified in 1993, emphasises that where 
children are able to, they should have a right to express views 
freely on all matters that affect them, and that due weight should 
be given to such views in accordance with the "age and maturity" of 
the eh i l d. Article 16 states that no eh i l d sha 11 be subjected to 
arbitrary or unlawful interference with his or her privacy. On the 
other hand, article 5 also requires respect for the responsibilities, 
rights and duties of parents or members of the extended family to 
provide appropriate directions and guidance for the child's exercise 
of the rights" ... in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities 
of the chi 1 d". 46 The decision wi 11 never be easy for a doctor to 
I Kennedy "Confidentiality , Competence and Malpractice" i n R Byrn e (ed) Medi c ine 
in Contemporary Society ( King's Coll e ge , London , 1986-1987) 41 . 
Above n 44 , 45. 
Above n 31 , 3 . 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
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make. In the UK a Dr RJ Brown was charged with improperly disclosing 
to the father of a 16 year old girl that she had been prescribed an 
oral contraceptive by the Birmingham Brook Advisory Centre. The 
dismissal of the charge by the GMC Disciplinary Committee was 
commented on with approva 1 in an edi tori a 1 of the BM}7, as 
reaffirming that the doctor has an obligation to act in the way he 
judges to be in the best interests of his patient, but it was later 
criticised by a senior barrister who insisted that Dr Brown had 
violated his patient's confidence! 48 
Section 3 of the Guardianship Act 1968 defines "upbringing" as 
including the education and rights of a child. Personal information 
about a child is part of that child's upbringing. Section 25 gives 
statutory recognition to the independent decisions of young persons: 
a young person of 16 years and over can give independent consent to 
any medical, dental or surgical procedure. 49 Section 25A, however, 
places no restriction on a female child in respect of her consent or 
refusal to consent to an abortion.~ 
The Children, Young Persons and Their Families Act 1989 provides that 
in respect of care and protection, the welfare of the child shall be 
paramount. Section 5 provides that "the pri nci p 1 e that consideration 
should be given to the wishes of the child or young person so far as 
those wishes can reasonab 1 y be ascertained ... having regard to the 
age, maturity and culture of the child or young person". 51 
"A case of confidence" Editorial (20 March 1971) . 
Above n 25, 62 . 
Cf s 22C(3) of the Health Act 1956, mentioned above part V A . See also V D 
Plueckhahn and SM Corder legal Medicine and Forensic Pathology (2 ed Melbourne 
University Press, 1991) 98, who point out that in the common law a medical 
practitioner may not disclose the condition of a child of sixteen years or above 
to the parents without the child's consent. 
L O'Reilly "Children's Rights and Privacy - the Impact on Care and Protection" 
Address at Privacy Issues Forum 1995 (Wellington, 29 June 1995) 2 . 
Above n 50, 3. 
52 
53 
54 
15 
The Commissioner for Children, Laurie O'Reilly, 52 feels that 
children's rights can be reconciled with parental rights and 
responsibilities, and has suggested that for the purposes of privacy 
issues, by analogy to the Gillick approach, authority could be given 
by either the child or the parent acting on behalf of the child. By 
having regard to the Guardianship Act 1968, 
Persons and Their Fami 1 i es Act 1989, and 
the Children, Young 
the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, the potential for parental 
input can be considered, but the guiding test must be whether 
d i s c 1 o s u re i s i n t he i n t e rest s of t he c h i 1 d . Hen a g ha n , 53 on t he o t he r 
hand, feels that as long as a young person understands the issues, 
such a young person has independent status to make the decision and 
determine his or her own best interests. Once capacity to decide is 
reached, a young person's decision should be respected. 
It must still be conceded that the general law governing the rights 
of children and the rights and obligations of parents and 
representatives is rather unc 1 ear and unsat i sfactory54. By giving 
equal rights of privacy to children, without clearly setting out the 
circumstances under which a parent or representative's decision may 
override the wishes of a young child, means that the Code has made 
the already difficult and nebulous situation worse. It has placed 
health agencies on a journey between Scylla and Charybdis: on the one 
hand there is the danger of breaching the Code and on the other hand 
the danger of depriving the chi 1 d of the guidance and care of a 
parent or guardian. "Best interests" is at best a vague concept, but 
even such guidance, as well as a clear indication of a particular 
age, such as 14 or 16 years, ought to have been set out in the Code. 
VI THE RULE AGAINST DISCLOSURE 
Above n 50 , 12. 
Above n 31, 6 . 
Office of the Privacy Commissioner "Health Information Code : Issues Paper No 3 . 
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A Limits on Disclosure of Health Information 
Rule 11 of the Code sets out the basic obligation not to disclose 
health information of an individual to third parties: 
"A health agency that holds health information must not 
disclose the information .... " 
This is followed by a list of six qualifying statements ("unless the 
agency believes, on reasonable grounds ... ") which are not exceptions 
(these are enumerated in subrule (2)(a) to (k)), but serve rather to 
define the scope of the confidentiality: 
(a) That the disclosure is to the individual concerned or the 
individual's representative. This confirms that confidentiality 
is concerned with disclosure to a third party and not the 
individual himself, which is actually self-explanatory. 
(b) That the disclosure is authorised by the individual or his 
representative. Consent obviously releases a health agency from 
the obligation of confidentiality. 
(c) That the disclosure is one of the purposes in connection 
with which the information was obtained. This would include 
instances where information is required for aspects of care and 
treatment 55 . The reasoning is that of presumed consent. 
(d) That the source of the information is a publicly available 
publication. The reasoning here seems obvious. It would be 
ridiculous to complain that a health agency has disclosed 
information if that information is already public knowledge! 
(e) That the information to be disclosed concerning a patient 
in hospital consists of only the most basic facts such as 
location and condition, and the individual has not forbidden 
such disclosure. This qualification shows that confidentiality 
does not nor ma 11 y i nc 1 ude abso 1 ute secrecy as to where a 
patient finds himself and whether he is dead or alive! 
(f) That the information to be disclosed concerns only the fact 
of death and is by a registered health professi ona 156 or 
Commentary on the Code 31. 
The Health Information Privacy Code 1994 Amendment No 2 amends the definition of 
a "registered health professional" . It now has the meaning given to it by section 
4 of the Health and Disability Commissioner Act 1994 . This means that a 
57 
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someone authorised by a health agency to a person whom it is 
reasonable in the circumstances to inform. This is rather 
obvious, for without such disclosure it might not even be 
possible to locate the deceased's representative. 
Subrule (1) can therefore be seen as a rather lengthy definition of 
what confidentiality includes or excludes. The qualifications in (a) 
to (f) are rather obvious, in the sense that they could almost be 
taken for granted. However, a detailed description is given ex 
abundanti cautela. 
The obligation not to disclose, as set out in rule 11, has always 
been known as "medical confidentiality". Medical confidentiality 
previously enjoyed only limited legal protection57 under medical 
professional ethics, legislation and the common law. 
B Medical Ethical Codes 
For doctors, the obligation of confidentiality has mainly been an 
ethical one embodied in medical ethical codes. The earliest source 
is contained in the Hippocratic Oath of Ancient Greece, dated around 
the fifth century BC, and part of it reads as follows: 
Into whatever house I enter, I wi 11 go into them for the benefit of the sick. 
Whatever, in connection with my professional pract ice, or not in connection 
with it, I see or hear, in the life of men, which ought not to be spoken of 
abroad, I will not divulge as reckoning that all such be kept secret. 58 
More recent codes have developed from this Hippocratic Oath. The 
Declaration of Geneva, adopted by the World Medical Association in 
1948, is more stringent: 
"registered health professional" wi 11 now be taken to refer al so to certain 
persons who are receiving training or gaining experience under the supervision of 
a registered health professional. 
See below part VIII for the legal protection under the Code. 
S Mclean & G Maher Medicine, Mora Is and the Law (Gower Publishing Co Ltd, 
Hampshire, 1983) 173 . 
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I wi 11 respect the secrets that are confided , n me even after the patient has 
d . d 59 1 e . 
This was followed by an international code of ethics in 
prepared by the World Medical Association: 
1949 60 l 
A doctor owes to his patient absolute secrecy in all which has been confided 
in him because of the confidence entrusted to him . 61 
The British Medical Association (BMA) states in its Handbook of 
Medica 7 Ethics: 
A doctor must preserve secrecy on all he knows, 
(This injunction is followed by a list of five exceptions). 
The New Zealand Medical Association (NZMA) has endorsed each of the 
international codes, and the obligation of confidentiality is 
recognised in its 1979 reprint, Medical Ethics and Etiquette, which 
states: 
5.1.1. The basis of the relationship between a doctor and a patient is that of 
absolute confidence and mutual respect. The patient expects his doctor not 
only to exercise professional skill, but also to observe secrecy with respect 
to the information he acquires as a result of his examination and treatment of 
a patient. 
5.2.1 It is the practitioner 's obligation to observe strictly the rule of 
professional secrecy by refraining from disclosing voluntarily without consent 
of the patient (save with statutory sanction) to any th ird party information 
which he has learnt in his professional relationship with the patient. 
In 1989 the NZMA revised its Code of Ethics. The preamble to the Code 
states that it is a principle of ethical behaviour to "protect the 
M Brazier Medicine, Patients and Law (2 ed Penguin Books , 1987) 44. 
Also 1968 and 1983 . 
Above n 23, 3 . 
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pat i en t ' s s e c re t s , even aft e r h i s o r he r de at h "62 , an d ( u n de r t h e 
heading "responsibilities to the patient") to" .. . . keep in confidence 
information derived from a patient or from a ~olleague regarding a 
patient, and divulge it only with the permission of the patient 
except when the law requires otherwise". 63 Al though membership of the 
NZMA is not compulsory, these rules are binding on all doctors 
because they may be subject to disciplinary procedures involving 
professional conduct.M 
C Statutory Obligations of Confidentiality 
1 Medical privilege 
The common law, as distinct from legislation, provides that doctors 
can be compelled to give in evidence information they acquire in 
confidence from their patients. 65 In the UK it has recently been 
recognised that the common law confers a discretion on Judges to 
refuse to compel a doctor to disclose confidential information. 
Medical privilege is the immunity which some medical people have from 
disclosing in court proceedings certain communications from 
patients.~ A doctor can be subpoenaed to give evidence but he can 
only withhold material from a court where his patient ' s 
communications are protected from disclosure by privilege. However, 
in contrast to the position in the UK, medical privilege in New 
Zealand has been governed by legislat i on since 1885. 67 The Evidence 
Amendment Act (No 2) 1980 provides for medical evidence in the course 
Above n 23 , 3 . 
V Hammond "Health Records and Information : Ac cess , Disclos ure and Confident i a 1 i t y " 
LLM Research Paper, VUW, 1992, 8 . 
M Jeffcoat "Medical Conf i dentiality " LLM Research Paper , VUW, 1985 , 60. 
"Doctors,Drivers and Confidentiality" (1974) 1 British Medical Journal , 399 . 
Above n 23, 1 . 
Above n 23, 9. 
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of legal proceedings. 
Section 32 of that Act provides that no registered practitioner or 
clinical psychologist shall, without the consent of the patient, 
disclose in any civil proceeding any protected communication which 
the patient believed to be necessary to enable the registered medical 
practitioner or clinical psychologist to examine, treat, or act for 
the patient. 68 This protected communication is narrowed down by the 
exclusion of communications made for any criminal purpose and those 
in respect of proceedings in which the sanity, testamentary capacity 
or life insurance is the matter in dispute. In Palhn v Department 
of Social Welfare69 Somers J at 276 stressed that a communication 
made to a medical practitioner could only be protected if the person 
who made it believed the communication to be necessary in order to 
be examined or treated. He said that such communication must include 
words and writings and also gestures or signs providing a response 
to inquiries made of a patient by the practitioner. 
Section 33 provides that no registered medical practitioner or 
clinical psychologist shall, without the consent of the patient, in 
criminal proceedings, disclose communications made to him by a 
patient for the purpose of treating drug dependency or any other 
condition or behaviour that manifests itself in criminal conduct. 
Section 35 is a general provision which confers a discretion upon 
courts in any proceedings to exclude what would otherwise be 
admissible evidence on the grounds of confidentiality. 70 The court 
must have regard to the special relationship between the witness and 
the person from whom the information was obtained, and must al so 
decide whether or not the public interest in having the evidence 
disclosed outweighs the public interest in the preservation of 
confidence between persons in the relative positions of the confidant 
and the witness. Section 35 may be invoked to exclude doctors and 
See above n 63, 34 . 
[1983) NZLR 266. 
Above n 23 , 24 . 
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some paramedical people from giving evidence in communications that 
are not specifically prohibited by sections 32 and 33. 71 
The legal protection offered by medical privilege, as set out above, 
obviously pertains only to a limited range of confidential 
communications and only in judicial proceedings. The definition 
"protected communication" is also restricted to information the 
patient tells the doctor and does not cover information which the 
doctor discovers from a physical examination or blood tests. 
2 Health workers 
Both section 62 of the Hospitals Act 1957 and section 50 of the Area 
Health Boards Act 1983 contained the basic prohibition (as well as 
exceptions) that employees (and former employees) of a Hospital Board 
or an Area Health Board must not disclose information concerning the 
condition or history of any patient without the prior consent of the 
patient. This meant that a statutory duty of confidentiality applied 
to all employees (and former employees) of public hospitals. In 1993 
the Area Health Boards Act 1983 as we 11 as large parts of the 
Hospitals Act 1957 were repealed. 
D The Common Law Duty Not to Disclose Information about Patients 
1 Breach of confidence 
The confidentiality of the doctor-patient relationship is protected 
by the common law, although there is little in the way of case law 
where this issue has had to be decided. There are dicta that simply 
assume that this is correct. In W v Egde77 12 Scott J said of the 
psychiatrist in question: "The question in the present case is not 
whether Dr Egdell was under a duty of confidence; he plainly 
Above n 23, 25; also above n 63, 34. 
[1990) 1 All ER 835 . 
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was ... 1173 Mason and McCall Smith 74 point out that if the Hippocratic 
principle has the strength of a moral or ethical doctrine, the words 
of Lord Coleridge cJ75 may apply: "A legal common law duty is nothing 
else than the enforcing by law of that which is a moral obligation 
without legal enforcement". They suggest that the right of the 
patient then depends upon the court's view of the moral position of 
the medical profession overseen in the UK by the GMC which has a very 
great authority based on statute. The alternative would be to view 
the Hippocratic principle as a mere statement of medical etiquette, 
offering no protection to a patient. 
However, it is generally accepted that the duty which may be owed by 
the doctor at common law is not the duty which is imposed on him by 
any code of professional ethics. 76 A doctor who breaches the legal 
obligation of confidentiality owed to a patient can possibly be 
liable in damages for breach of confidence. Breach of confidence, an 
action which has been recognised in English law since the early 
nineteenth century77 , is not limited to those relationships that a~e 
traditionally viewed as involving trust and confidence, such as 
doctor-patient,solicitor-client, employer-employee, banker-customer, 
etc. The courts look at the circumstances in which information has 
been imparted to determine whether such a duty exists, as well as the 
scope of that duty. 78 In A.G v Guardian Newspapers (No 2) 79 Lord 
Goff said at 658 that equity will intervene to protect confidences 
when three requirements are met, namely a) the information must have 
the necesssary quality of confidence about it; b) it must have been 
See also M Jones Medical Negligence (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1991) 46 . 
Above n 38, 95 . 
R v Instan [1893] 1 QB 450 at 453 . 
RJ Paterson "Aids, HIV Testing, and Medical Confidentiality" (1991) 7 Otago Law 
Review 390. 
D Laster "Breaches of Confidence and of Privacy by Misuse of Personal Information" 
(1989) 7 Otago Law Review 32. 
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imparted in circumstances importing an obligation of confidence; and 
c) there must be unauthorised use of that information to the 
detriment of the person who communicated it. 80 
The jurisprudential basis of the action for breach of confidence has 
long been debated. Property, contract, tort and equity have all been 
suggested as appropriate bases for the action. 81 
2 Neg 1 i gence 
Doctors are considered to have a common law duty of care not to 
disclose confidential information about their patients (without their 
consent) to third parties. 82 A breach of this duty of care gives 
rise to an action in tort for damages. It would, however, have to be 
foreseeable that disclosure of that information would cause the 
patient harm. In Furniss v Fitchett83 a doctor was found to be liable 
in negligence for forwarding a written statement, relating to the 
patient's soundness of mind, to the husband of the patient. The 
document was subsequently produced in proceedings between the husband 
and wife for separation and maintenance. Burrowclough CJ relied upon 
"the general conception of relations giving rise to the duty of care" 
to find a duty in tort. 84 
3 Contract 
In some instances, it is possible to identify a contractual 
relationship between a doctor and patient, and an implied term of the 
contract may be that the doctor shall not disclose confidential 
Above n 73, 46 . 
Above n 77, 33 . 
Above n 49, 98 . 
[1958] NZLR 396. 
Above n 77, 41 . 
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information about the patient. 85 In Parry-Jones v The Law Society6 
Diplock LJ said at 180: 
What we are concerned with here is the contractual duty of confidence, 
generally implied though sometimes expressed between a solicitor and client . 
Such a duty exists not only between solicitor and client, but, for example, 
between banker and customer, doctor and patient, and accountant and 
client. 87 
Likewise, in Duncan v Medi ea 7 Practitioners Disc i p 7 i nary Counc i 188 
Jeffries J said at 520 that the concept of professional 
confidence ... "on a strict analysis of legal relationships, ... is 
probably contractually based". 
The cons i de ration for the contract is the fee wh i eh the patient 
impliedly promises to pay and for wh i eh he may be sued. 89 Such a 
contractual duty would only be able to exist in the case of a fee 
paying patient in a private consultation, but not between a doctor 
and patient in a hospital situation. 90 This means that a contractual 
relationship cannot always be relied upon between doctor and patient. 
4 Property 
Another possibility is that the duty of confidentiality may be 
regarded as having a proprietary foundation. This means that the 
information remains the property of the patient and that breach of 
confidence consists of the unauthorised dealing with the property of 
another. 91 It is commonly recognised that patients have a proprietary 
Above n 49, 98. 
[1968) 1 All ER 177. 
Above n 23, 28. 
(1986) 1 NZLR 513. 
Above n 49, 98. 
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interest in the information contained in their health records, even 
though health providers maintain proprietary ownership of the 
original records. 92 
S Fiduciary duty (equity) 
The fundamental basis of a doctor's duty not to disclose confidential 
information about patients is the concept of fiduciary obligation 93 . 
In Duncan v Medical PractJ'tioners Disdplinary Counci7 94 Jeffries J 
said at 520: "The platform support of a description of medical 
confidence is to identify the doctor/patient relationship as a 
fiduciary one". A duty of confidence frequently arises from a 
relationship between a professional person (such as a lawyer or 
accountant) and the client. In Day v Mead95 Cooke P, referring to the 
solicitor-patient context, said at 451 that "breach of confidence is 
usually classified as a subject of equitable jurisdiction 11 • 96 
6 Invasion of privacy 
Apart from breach of confidence there is also an action for invasion 
of privacy. In 1890, when the American scholars Brandeis and Warren 97 
argued for a general right of privacy, they referred to Prince Albert 
v StrangJB (the earliest case which expressly recognises breach of 
confidence as well as a right of privacy) to show "that the common 
law has for a century and a half protected privacy in certain 
cases". 99 The United States came to recognise a tort for the invasion 
Above n 63, 1 4 . 
Above n 23, 28 . 
Above n 88 . 
[1987) 2 NZLR 443. 
Above n 76, 391 . 
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of privacy as a result of the Brandeis and Warren article. In 1986 
invasion of privacy was recognised as a potential tort in New Zealand 
in Tucker v News Media Ownership Ltd100 and the court relied on 
American decisions. Tucker sought and obtained an interim injunction 
against News Media to prevent it from publishing any information 
about Tucker's prior convictions. At the time Tucker was much in the 
public eye because of a public fund raising campaign to pay for him 
to have a heart transplant in Australia. The basis for relief was the 
tort of intentional infliction of distress and alternatively the tort 
of invasion of privacy. Jeffries, at 731-732 said: 
I am aware of the development in other jurisdictions of the tort of invasion 
of privacy and the facts of this case seem to raise such an issue in a 
dramatic form . A person who lives an ordinary pr i vate life has a r i ght to be 
left alone and to live the private aspects of his life without being sub j ected 
to unwarranted, or undesired, publicity or public disclosure . .. In my view the 
right to privacy in the circumstances before the Court may prove the plaintiff 
with a valid cause of action in this country . 
7 Has the common Taw been superseded by the Code? 
In Hobson v Harding and others101 Thorp J stressed that the Privacy 
Act and the Code have not codified the law relating to privacy and 
have therefore not superseded the common law rights in the same area. 
He referred to section 115 of the Privacy Act and said that if the 
Act did replace the common law there would be no need to enact a 
specific exception to common law liability under principle 6. Section 
115(2) refers to "the law relating to ... breach of confidence" which 
acknowledges the continued existence of this common law tort. 
It is still possible to pursue compensation through the court system 
by means of a civil claim based on a common law action102 , but this 
(1986] 2 NZLR 716. 
Unreported,6 March 1995, High Court, Auckland,CP312/94 . See also "Privacy Issues 
in Medicine" Address by Privacy Commisoner to Third Annual Medico-legal 
Conference, Wellington, 30 March 1995 in Health In-formation & Privacy in New 
Zealand 101. 
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may not now be the best option available because of the availability 
of an alternative means of pursuing a remedy by lodging a complaint 
with the Privacy Commissioner. 103 
VII EXCEPTIONS TO THE OBLIGATION NOT TO DISCLOSE 
A Statutory Provisions Authorising or Requiring Disclosure 
1 Omission from the Code 
Rule 11(2) lists a number of exceptions to the basic rule not to 
disclose information about an individual to third parties . The most 
obvious exception, namely that of statutory authorisation and duties 
to disclose, is strangely absent. It does, however , appear in section 
7(1) of the Privacy Act, which is relevant to the Code and therefore 
to rule 11. Section (7)(1) provides that "nothing in principle 6 or 
principle 11 derogates from any prov i sion that is contained in any 
enactment and that authorises or requires personal information to be 
made avai 1 able". This means that where there is another enactment 
permitting, authorising or requiring something to be done, that 
statute will override the relevant rule of the Code104 . For example, 
the Health Act 1956 was amended in 1993 and section 22C was added, 
referring to the Privacy Act and any Code issued under the Act, and 
permitting providers and purchasers of health and di sabi 1 i ty services 
to disclose health information to a number of persons for the 
purposes of exercising or performing any of those persons' powers, 
duties or functions. One of the purposes of the Code is to set out 
the duties of health agencies with regard to the privacy of 
individuals as clearly as possible, and for this reason it is 
respectful 1 y submitted that this exception ought to have been 
included. The provision set out in section 7(1) of the Privacy Act 
ought to have been repeated in rule 11. 
See below part VIII A. 
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2 Statutes which require medical practitioners to give notice and 
supply information 
There are two classes of statutes that relate to the duty of doctors 
to disclose information about patients. 105 These statutory 
provisions applied prior to the Privacy Act and the Code and still 
continue to apply. There are those which place an obligation on 
doctors to initiate the supply of information by way of notification, 
and those which protect doctors if information is elicited from them 
by persons acting pursuant to a statutory power. Examples of statutes 
and regulations which oblige doctors to notify are: 
Contraception, Sterilisation, and Abortion Act 1977 
Maternal Mortality Research Act 1968 
Hea 1th Act 1956 
The Venereal Diseases Regulations 1982 (SR 1982/215) 
Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1995 
Hospitals Act 1957 
Tuberculosis Act 1948 
Transport (Vehicle and Driver Registration and Licensing) Act 
1986 
Medical Practitioners Act 1968, section 34 
Psychologists Act 1981 . 
3 Statutes and regulations which require medical practitioners to 
give information on request 
Examples of the above are: 
Coroners Act 1988 
Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Act 1992 
Social Security Act 1964 
Health Act 1956, section 22F 
Judicature Act 1908 
Medical Practitioners Act 1968, section 61 
Medical Auxiliaries Act 1966 
Transport Act 1962 
Above n 23, 29 . 
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Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989 
Human Tissue Act 1964 
Civil Aviation Act 1990 
A statutory duty to disclose information has always been an exception 
to the duty of confidentiality, and this is still the case. It must 
certainly rank as one of the most important exceptions to the rule 
against disclosure in the Code, and for this reason, as stated 
before, it should have been mentioned in rule 11 of the Code. 
8 Disclosure in Accordance with Recognised Professional Practice 
1 Rule 11(2)(b) 
Subrule 2{b) of rule 11 allows disclosure of health information by 
a registered health professi ona 1106 without the authority of the 
individual to one of three categories of persons, namely, either a 
person nominated by the i ndi vi dual concerned, or the pri nci pal 
caregiver, or a near relative of the individual "in accordance with 
recognised professional practice", provided the disclosure is not 
contrary to the express request of the individual or his or her 
representative. This rule is obviously designed to cater for the 
position regarding young children107 , as well as cases where an 
individual may be too ill to care or make decisions for him or 
herself and disclosure to a person who is close to the patient may 
be necessary or helpful. By adding the category "a person nominated 
by the individual concerned" to that of "a near relative", the Code 
recognises the fact that a patient may wish to nominate a good friend 
or live-in-lover to whom information may be disclosed rather than a 
relative. A traditional question on admission forms at public 
hospitals in New Zealand was often: "Who is your next of kin?" Apart 
from omitting the purpose for which this information was collected, 
the question assumed that patients would nominate a close relative 
Above n 56. 
See above part VA . 
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as a contact per-son, whereas in reality this is not always the 
case. 108 This exception (rule 11(2)(b)) is based on presumed consent 
and the individual concerned is able to veto such disclosure by means 
of an express request. 
2 Recognised professional practice 
The GMC's "Bluebook" Professional Conduct: FHness to pracUse 1991 
lists eight exceptions where information about a patient may be 
disclosed. Exceptions no 3 and no 4 deal with disclosure to relatives 
or persons close to the patient. No 3 provides that where it is 
undesirable on medical grounds to seek the patient's consent, 
information regarding the patient's health may sometimes be given in 
confidence to a close relative or a person in a similar relationship 
to the patient. No 4 provides that if, in the doctor's opinion, 
disclosure of information to a third party other than a relative 
would be in the best interests of the patient, the doctor must make 
every reasonable effort to persuade the patient to allow the 
information to be given. Only in exceptional circumstances may the 
doctor go ahead and impart such information without the patient's 
consent . 109 Brazi er 110 points out that acting in the patient's best 
interests is not in i tse 1 f a defence to breach of confidence, and 
that the legal justification for talking to third parties without 
consulting the patient is usually presumed consent. 111 
Subrule (2)(b) makes no mention of a patient's "best interests" which 
clearly shows that this cannot be the criterion. It also states that 
an individual may expressly request that information should not be 
disclosed in accordance with recognised professional practice. In the 
B Stewart "The Privacy Act and the Family" Address at the International Year of 
the Family "Rights and Responsibilities" Symposium, Wellington , 14 October 1994 , 
3. 
Above n 73, 49. 
Above n 59, 51. 
In contrast to this view, Mason and McCa 11 Smith, above n 38, 98 consider the 
exception that it is ethical to break confidentiality without the patient's 
consent when it is in his or her own interests to do so as "unexcept i ona 1 save to 
those fanatically opposed to so called professional paternalism" . 
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case of patients moving in and out of psychiatric inst i tutions and 
the care of a family member or caregiver, the disclosure of 
information can be a difficult issue. Such a patient may be hostile 
to his or her caregiver and veto the disclosure of any 
information. 112 Where a clinician considers a psychiatric patient to 
lack the mental capacity to give or withhold consent, disclosure may 
be made to or with the authority of his or her representative 
according to Subrule (1)(a)(ii) and (b)(ii) of rule 11. However, 
where a patient does have the necessary mental capacity and forbids 
disclosure to a family member or caregiver, such a wish must be 
respected. 
One could probably safely say that the legal position was the same 
prior to the Privacy Act and the Code, but that doctors and other 
health workers may not have been aware that a patient's "best 
interests", as perceived by others, may not override the patient's 
wishes with regard to the disclosure of information. 
C Djsclosure jn the Publjc Interest 
1 Rule 11(2)(d) 
Rule 11 (2)(d) provides that information may be disclosed without the 
individual's authorisation provided 
that the disclosure of the information is necessary to prevent or lessen a 
serious and imminent threat to: 
(i) public health or public safety; or 
(ii) the life or health of the individual concerned or another individual . 
This provision is qualified by subrule (3), namely that disclosure 
is permitted only to the extent necessary for the particular purpose. 
This exception, recognised by professional eth i ea l codes and the 
Commentary to the Code 31-32 . See al so A Z i ppl e "Client Information and the 
Family's Need to Know: Strategies for Resolving the Conflict" (1990) Community 
Mental Health Journal 533. 
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common law, has long been known as a disclosure which is justified 
on the grounds of public interest and safety. 113 A doctor 1 s 
considered to have an overriding duty to society and this is the most 
controversial permissible exception in that it rests on subjective 
definitions: society is not homogenous and the judgements of 
individual doctors are bound to differ. 114 
2 Disclosure in the public interest prior to the Code 
It has long been recognised that disclosure of information about a 
patient by a doctor may, in rare circumstances, be justified in the 
public interest. 
In A.G v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) 115 at 545 and 659 Lord Goff 
said the following: 116 
... although the basis of the law's protection of confidence is that there is 
a public interest that confidences should be preserved and protected by the 
law, nevertheless that public interest may be outweighed by some other 
countervailing public interest which favours disclosure . .. It is this binding 
principle which may require a court to carry out a balancing operation , 
weighing the public interest in maintaining confidence again s t a 
countervailing public interest favouring disclosure . 
In order to determine whether the public interest exception, as set 
out in rule 11(2)(d), has brought about any changes whatsoever, one 
has to look at the scope of this defence in the specific context of 
the doctor-patient relationship as construed in case law. 
(a) W v Egde11117 
Above n 24, 23;see also R Paterson "Blowing the whistle on dangerous patients" (3 
March 1994) NZ Doctor 25 . 
Above n 38, 98. 
Above n 79. 
Above n 73, 51 . 
(1990] 1 All ER 835. 
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The scope of the public interest defence in the specific context of 
the doctor-patient relationsh i p was considered in W v Egdell. 118 
The question was whether a psychiatrist who had prepared a medical 
report on a patient was entitled to disclose the contents of the 
report both to the hospital where the patient was detained and to the 
Home Secretary. W, diagnosed as being a paranoid schizophrenic, was 
detained as a patient in a secure hospital, following a conviction 
for manslaughter of five neighbours, on the ground of diminished 
responsibility. 119 Ten years after he had been detained, he applied 
to a mental health review tribunal to be discharged or transferred 
to a regional secure unit with a view to his eventual discharge. His 
responsible medical officer, who had diagnosed him as suffering from 
schizophrenia, which could be treated by drugs, supported the 
application, but it was opposed by the Home Secretary. His solicitors 
instructed a consultant psychiatrist to examine Wand to produce an 
independent psychiatric report for the purposes of the tribunal 
hearing. In his report Dr Egdell strongly opposed W's transfer, and 
sent the report to W's solicitors in the belief that it would be 
placed before the tribunal. In view of the contents of the report, 
W withdrew his application through his solicitors. When Dr Egdell 
discovered that the application had been withdrawn and that neither 
the tribunal nor the hospital charged with W's clinical management 
had received a copy of his report, he contacted the medical director 
of the hospital, who agreed that the hospital should receive a copy 
of the report in the interests of W' s further treatment. At Dr 
Egdell 's prompting, the hospital sent a copy of this report to the 
Home Secretary, who, in turn, forwarded the report to the tribunal 
when referring W's case to them for consideration. 
Both Scott J and the Court of Appeal spoke of the danger to the 
public as a criterion which justified disclosure. The public interest 
is also a broader concept than simply "danger to the public", and 
t he re fo re i n c l u des d an g e r t o a s i n g l e i n d i v i du a l . 120 
Above n 117, ; see also n 73, 51. 
Above n 26, 649. 
Above n 73, 54 . 
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The English Court of Appeal first confirmed that Dr Egdell did owe 
W a duty of confidence. But the duty of confidentiality is not 
absolute and the public interest in medical confidentiality must be 
balanced against the public interest in public safety. If Dr Egdell 's 
diagnosis was correct, W remained a source of danger to others, and 
he was justified in disclosing his report. 121 
The court's decision in W v 
requirements of rule 11(2)(d), 
Egdell is consistent with the 
namely that disclosure must be 
necessary to prevent or lessen a serious and imminent threat to {i) 
public health or public safety; or (ii) the life or health of the 
individual concerned or another individual. 
(b) X V y 122 
In Xv Y123 a tabloid newspaper acquired, in breach of confidence of 
a health authority employee, information identifying two general 
practitioners who were continuing to practise after having been 
diagnosed as HIV positive. The health authority sought an injunction 
to prevent the publication of the identity of the two doctors. The 
newspaper argued that the public at large, and the doctors' patients 
in particular, had an interest in knowing that the doctors were HIV 
positive. It was held by Rose J that the public interest in 
preserving the confidentiality of hospital records identifying actual 
or potential AIDS sufferers outweighed the public interest in the 
freedom of the press to publish such information. He reviewed the 
evidence about transmission of HIV from doctor to patient where the 
doctor had received proper counseling about safe practice, and found 
that the risk to patients was negligible. There was a far greater 
risk in the possibility that if they could not rely on confidential 
treatment, people with AIDS, or those who feared they might have 
AIDS, would not seek medical help. 
Above n 59, 43 . 
[1988] 2 All ER 648. 
Above n 122 . 
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Once again the decision in this case is consistent with the Code, in 
that disclosure of the information was in this case not justified 
because there was no serious and imminent threat to the public health 
or public safety or the life or health of the i ndi vi dual concerned 
or another i ndi vi dual. 124 
(c) Duncan v Medical Practitioners Disciplinary Committee125 
Duncan was a registered medical practitioner in a small rural 
community. Henry, one of his patients, was a bus driver and had 
operated a passenger service business for 30 years. Duncan attended 
Henry on the occasion of two heart attacks, after whi eh Henry 
underwent a triple coronary artery bypass operation. After the 
successful operation Henry obtained a medical certificate from the 
surgeon to enable him to obtain a licence to drive passenger service 
vehicles. On the day before Henry intended to take his bus to 
Auckland on a charter trip, Duncan spoke to a prospective passenger 
and told her that Henry was not fit to drive the bus. Duncan also 
spoke to Henry and on discovering that he had a licence to drive a 
passenger service vehicle, sought assistance from a local police 
constable to have Henry's licence revoked. Later Duncan asked a 
patient at his surgery to help him organise a petition to have Henry 
barred from driving passenger service vehicles. Duncan was found 
guilty of professional misconduct for breach of professional 
confidence by the Medical Practitioners Disciplinary Committee. 
Duncan subsequently made a statement to the national news media about 
Henry's heart condition and his fitness to drive. Once again Henry 
complained and the Disciplinary Committee found Duncan guilty of 
professional misconduct by disclosing confidential information to the 
national news media in breach of his professional responsibilities. 
Duncan brought judicial review proceedings in the High Court, seeking 
a declaration that the Disciplinary Committee's decision was ultra 
vires, unauthorised and invalid. He also challenged the validity of 
Above n 23, 43; see also above n 59, 54 . 
Above n 88. 
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the charge laid against him by the Proceedings Committee. The High 
Court found that the framing of a single charge of disgraceful 
conduct in a professional respect, supported by seven particulars of 
separate complaints, was invalid. The Proceedings Committee appealed 
against this and the Court of Appeal held that the proceedings 
Committee could aggregate a number of different kinds of conduct and 
formulate an omnibus charge against a practitioner for determination 
by the Medical Council, provided the doctor was properly informed of 
what he was charged. 
Duncan made three disclosures 126 , namely to the prospective 
passenger, to the police and to the media. The disclosure to the 
police was not the subject of the complaint, nor was it criticized 
by the Medical Council or the courts. The Disciplinary Committee's 
decision included the following reasons for censuring Duncan 
:" ..... he breached professional confidence in informing lay people 
of the personal medical history of his patient". The Committee took 
the view that professional confidence could only be breached in the 
most exceptional circumstances and then only if the public interest 
was paramount. 
The Disciplinary Committee found that communication should only be 
made to the "responsible authority" (in this case the statutory 
agency having the responsibility to grant or withdraw a passenger 
service licence). Disclosure to lay people who could not be 
considered to be responsible authorities was serious and amounted to 
professional misconduct. 
The reference to "public interest" perhaps anticipates that there is 
a public official that will have the powers to do something about the 
matter to protect the public interest. 127 In the Duncan case, 
Jeffries J said at 521: "I think a doctor who has decided to 
communicate should discriminate and ensure the recipient is a 
responsible authority." 
Above n 4, 31. 
Above n 4, 31. 
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If we apply the Code to the facts in the Duncan case, we find that 
to rely on the exception in rule 11(2)(d), Dr Duncan would have had 
to believe, on reasonable grounds, that it was not desirable or 
practicable to obtain Henry's authorisation for the disclosure. 
Subrule 3 makes it clear that disclosure is permitted "only to the 
extent necessary for the particular purpose or to satisfy the 
particular request for information". Duncan thought that the 
disclosure was necessary to prevent or lessen a serious and imminent 
threat to public health or public safety. Measured against the Code, 
if Duncan had disclosed "only to the extent necessary for the 
particular purpose" he would have disclosed only to the relevant 
authority so that such authority could take up the matter. 
Jeffries J said at 521 that "that qualification [that confidentiality 
may be breached when another's life is immediately endangered] cannot 
be advanced so as to attenuate, or undermine, the immeasurably 
valuable concept of medical confidence." It has been suggested that 
to acknowledge that a doctor can issue a warning where appropriate, 
while rigorously maintaining the concept of medical confidence, 
places an impossible burden on the doctor, as he does need an overt 
acknowledgement of an accepted corresponding attenuation of this 
confidence . 128 Such an acknowledgement, whi eh confirms the common 
law position, is now clearly stated in rule 11(2)(d). 
It is important to note that the "public interest" exception to 
medical confidentiality covers a threat of harm to three possible 
persons or groups of people, namely the public, the patient 
concerned, or another individual. The case law discussed above deals 
with examples of a threat of harm to the public or a third person. 
The position regarding the patient concerned can be problematic. 
Where competent adults are involved, breaches of confide nee to 
protect a patient from him or herself usually involve a violation of 
that individual's autonomy, and are difficult to justify. Beauchamp 
Above n 64, 43 . 
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& Childress 129 suggest that possible benefit and prevention of harm 
to the individual ought to be considered before making such a 
disclosure. Subrule 2(d), however, makes it clear that only the 
"prevention of harm" to "prevent or lessen a serious and imminent 
threat to ... the life or hea 1th of the i ndi vi dual concerned" may be 
considered and not the contemplation of any benefit to a patient. 
D The Duty to Warn 
1 The Code: no duty to warn 
Subrule (2)(d) of rule 11 permits disclosure in the public interest 
but does not enunciate a duty to disclose . 130 In an address 131 in 
1994 the Privacy Commissioner said: "I do not intend to attempt to 
define how far an individual medical practitioner's 'duty to warn' 
extends." This also explains the deliberate omission in the Code. 
2 Is there a common law duty to warn? 
In New Zealand the common law has traditionally been reluctant to 
impose duties of affirmative action. According to Todd et 
a1 13211 .•• the general principle is .. that a person is bound not to 
inflict damage on another but is not bound to take positive action 
to prevent injury to .. that other". A doctor is under no legal 
obligation to come to the aid of a stranger, even in an emergency, 
although the Medical Council of New Zealand confirmed in a statement 
TL Beauchamp and JF Childress "The Rule of Confidentiality" i n N Abrams and MD 
Buckner Medical Ethics: A Clinical Textbook and Reference -for the Health Care 
Professionals (MIT Press , Cambridge , Massachusetts and London, 1983) 26 . 
K McDonald "Ensuring records are confidential and correct" (8 December 1994) NZ 
Doctor 35 points out that even though an exception to the rule applies, thereby 
permitting disclosure, an agency may still decide not to disclose. Rule 11 does 
not in any way oblige an agency to disclose. 
Above n 4, 30. 
SMD Todd et al The Law of Tort in New Zealand (The Law Book Co, Sydney, 1991) 132 . 
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in September 1990133 that a doctor has an ethical obligation to 
render assistance in an emergency. The position appears to be 
different if the endangered person is a patient of the doctor, in 
which case there is perhaps a legal duty of affirmative care based 
on the special relationship between doctor and patient. 1~ 
Paul Sieghart 135 , commenting on the "Guidance on Ethics for 
Occupational Medicine of the Royal College of Physicians Faculty of 
Occupational Medicine 1980", said that a professional code cannot 
leave it to the individual members of the profession to solve the 
dilemma as best they can, "after consulting their unguided conscience 
and perhaps a few respected co 11 eagues". A code must say something 
about how to approach this kind of problem. Sieghart expresses the 
opinion that this is not done because "all those who have been given 
the unenviable task of drafting such codes have found such problems 
beyond them." 
In New Zealand it has not been conclusively resolved whether there 
is, in rare circumstances, a common law duty upon doctors to disclose 
information about patients to avoid physical harm to third persons. 
There are, however, obiter dicta which suggest such a duty, as well 
as an American decision which may have persuasive influence should 
such a case come before the courts. 1~ 
In W v Egde77137 the Court of Appeal indicated that Dr Egdell was 
justified in disclosing the report, but although it was hinted that 
a doctor in his position owes a duty to the public, the decision does 
not suggest that Dr Egdell was under a duty to disclose the 
report . 138 It has been suggested that this approach is perhaps 
"The doctor's obligation to render assistance in an emergency" . 
Above n 76, 396. 
Above n 90, 31 . 
Above n 23, 41 . 
Above n 117. 
Above n 73, 55. 
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indicative of judicial reluctance to impose a positive duty to warn 
on a psychiatrist faced with the sort of dilemma which confronted Dr 
Egde 11 . 139 
In Furniss v Fitchett 140 Burrowclough CJ said at 405-406 that a 
doctor may be justified in breaching patient confidence and hinted 
at a duty to do so under certain circumstances, when the doctor 
discovers that his patient entertains delusions in respect of another, and in 
his disordered state of mind is liable at any moment to cause death or 
grievous bodily harm to that other. Can it be doubted for one moment that the 
public interest requires him to report that finding to someone. 
In yet another obiter dictum, in Duncan v Medical Practitioners 
Disciplinary Committee141 Jeffries J said at 521: 
There may be occasions, they are fortunate 1 y rare, when a doctor receives 
information i nvolving a patient that another's life is immediately endangered 
and urgent action is required. The doctor must then exercise his professional 
j udgment based upon the circumstances, and if he fair 1 y and reasonab 1 y 
believes such a danger exists, then he must 142 act unhesitatingly to 
prevent injury or loss of life even if there is to be a breach of 
confidentiality. 
Beauchamp and Childress1~ are of the opinion that one may not breach 
a confidence except to fulfil another and more stringent duty -
either a duty to obey the law or a duty to protect the welfare of the 
patient or the community. They stress: "There is no right to violate 
confidences in such cases unless there is also a duty to do so". 
In an American case, Tarasoff v Regents of University of 
Above n 76, 395. 
Above n 83; see also above n 76, 395. 
Above n 88. 
Emphasis added . 
Above n 129, 25. 
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California144 it was held that a psychiatrist had a duty to warn a 
potential victim of harm that was likely to be inflicted by a patient 
of the psychiatrist. 145 The psychiatrist employed by the student 
medical centre at the University of California told the staff of his 
patient's violent intentions and the staff warned the police, who 
decided to take no action. The medical centre said nothing to the 
girl, and she was murdered by the patient soon afterwards. The 
medical centre was found liable for failing to breach the patient's 
confidentiality and warn the girl of the threat to her life146. 
Tobriner J said at 337: 
If the exercise of reasonable care to protect the threatened victim requires 
the doctor to warn the endangered party ... we see no suff1 ci ent societal 
interest that would protect unjustified concealment. The containment of such 
risk lies in the public interest . 
and at 347 147 : 
We conclude that the public policy favoring protection of the confidential 
character of patient-psychotherapist communications must yield to the extent 
to wh i eh disclosure is essential to avert danger to others. The protected 
privilege ends where the public peril begins . 
English law recognises no general duty to control the actions of 
another party in an effort to prevent harm being inflicted on third 
parties. A duty of care has been held to exist only in certain 
limited situations, namely where a special relationship exists. In 
Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co ud148 the element of contra l was the 
determining factor in the relationship between the officers and the 
boys. In Holgate v Lancashire Mental Hospitals BoarJ 49 the 
(1976) 551 P 2d 334 . 
Above n 112, 536. 
Above n 59, 58. 
See also KC de Haan "My Patient's Keeper? The Liability of Medical Practitioners 
for Negligent Injury to Third Parties" (1986) Professional Negligence 89. 
(1970) AC 1004 . 
[ 1 9 3 7) 4 All ER 1 9 . 
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existence of a duty of care owed by the medical officer to the 
plaintiff was based on the care and control over mental defectives. 
In a doctor-patient relationship an element of control is not always 
discernible, and the source of the recognition of a duty of care owed 
to third persons can then be sought in the doctor's unique capacity 
to influence behaviour, either in the treatment he provides or advice 
he gives patients. Since the decision in Anns v Merton London 
Borough Counc; 1150 , the courts have taken a new appr9ach. Having 
determined the existence of a sufficient relationship of 
neighbourhood or proximity, it must be considered whether the duty 
should be negatived, reduced or limited in scope. 151 
Brazier 152 points out, however, that on similar facts to those in the 
Tarasoff case, an English court would be most unlikely to find a 
doctor negligent. She quotes Smjth v Ljttlewood Organjsat;ons LtJ 53 
to illustrate that the courts in England are reluctant to make A 
liable for a wrong committed by B. 
3 AIDS and the duty to warn 
In Britain the GMC has addressed the difficult conflict between 
confidentiality and the duty to warn that is potentially raised by 
finding that a patient is HIV positive. 154 If the patient is in an 
active sexual relationship, whether in a marriage or with a gay 
partner, there is a real and identifiable risk posed to the sexual 
partner of the patient. The doctor who has an HIV positive patient 
ought first to counsel the patient and discuss the implications for 
his sexual partner. The GMC states: 11 there are grounds for 
[1978] AC 728 . 
Above n 147, 87-88 . 
Above n 59, 58 . 
[1987] 1 All ER 710 . 
General Medical Council, 1988. See A Campbell, G Gillett and G Jones Practical 
Medical Ethics (Oxford University Press, 1992) 125 . 
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disclosing that a patient is HIV positive to a third party without 
the consent of the patient only where there is a serious and 
identifiable risk to a specific individual who, if not so informed, 
would be exposed to infection 11 • 155 The NZMA followed the GMC stand 
in its 1990 protocol on HIV status and Patient Confidentiality. 156 
It has been suggested1~ that the AIDS pandemic may bring into focus 
the possibility of a common law duty of care upon doctors to divulge 
confidential information about patients to third parties. An example 
much quoted is that of Mr and Mrs A, both patients of Dr B. The 
husband is diagnosed as HIV positive but he refuses to tell his wife 
of his condition and will not allow Dr B to inform Mrs A. Dr B surely 
owes Mrs A a duty of care, but even if she were not his patient, he 
may have a duty in the public interest. Kennedy and Grubb 158 
suggest that one way of determining whether there is a duty on a 
doctor to breach confidence in the context of HIV infection or any 
other context would be to ask whether someone infected with HIV by 
a patient would have a claim in negligence against the patient's 
doctor. 
However, in spite of the opinions of the NZMA, comments of writers 
and obiter dicta from court cases, in the absence of a court decision 
to this effect, it cannot be said with certainty that a common law 
duty to warn, i.e. to disclose information to a third party in the 
public interest, exists in New Zealand. It is understandable, 
therefore, that in order to confirm the common law position, no such 
duty was established in rule 11 of the Code, leaving the position as 
uncertain as it was before. 
See also R Gillon "AIDS and Medical Confidentiality" (1987) 294 British Medical 
Jou rna 1 1676, who says:" .. such circumstances wi 11 be extreme 1 y rare" . 
Policy adopted by New Zealand Medical Association National Assembly, Wellington, 
12 September 1990. See above n 76, 380. 
Above n 23, 41 . 
Above n 26, 665. 
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E Maintenance of Law and Order 
Subrule (2)(i) of rule 11 allows disclosure that is necessary for the 
maintenance and enforcement of law, including the prevention, 
detection, investigation, prosecution and punishment of offences or 
the conduct of proceedings. It can therefore al so be seen as a = o ~Q 
"public interest" exception. 
1 Prevention, detection, investigation, prosecution and punishment 
of offences 
(a) Reporting of any crime 
Subrule (2)(i)(i) clearly allows disclosure of health informat i on in 
relation to offences. The wide range of "prevention, detection, 
investigation, prosecution and punishment" is included. 159 There are 
two requirements, namely that the health agency would have to believe 
on reasonable grounds that authorisation from the individual i s not 
desirable or practicable (subrule (2)), and that the disclosure is 
only to the extent necessary for the particular purpose (subrule 
( 3)) . 
This exception deals with the disclosure of information that may 
relate to offences that have been committed or that may be committed 
in the future. The most dramatic dilemma is posed by the possibility 
of violent crime. What if the doctor knows that his patient has just 
committed rape, especially if there is evidence that this is but one 
of a series of attacks on women? Prior to the Privacy Act and the 
Code this exception was well known. Britain's GMC lists it as one 
of the exceptions to a doctor's duty to maintain confidentiality: 160 
Rarely, disclosure may be justified on the ground that it is i n the publi c 
interest, which, in certain circumstances , such as , for e x ample, i nvest i gation 
The Health Act 1956 has been amended and s 22C(2)(f) allows disclosure of health 
information if that information is required by "any member of the Po 1 ice , for the 
purposes of exercising or performing any of that person's powers, duties or 
functions . . " 
GMC "Bluebook" Professional Conduct : Fitness to Practise (February 1991) 18-20 . 
161 
162 
163 
164 
45 
b y t he police of a g ra ve or ve r y s er ious cri me, mig ht overri d e t he doctor's 
d ut y to ma,nt a, n h is pat ient ' s c on fi d e nce. 
Although such disclosure was considered permissible, it was not 
compulsory. There is case law to the effect that the doctor need not 
even assist the police by answering their questions concerning hi s 
patients. 161 Both medical and legal opinion has been di vided on this 
issue, although published statements are largely confined to the 
subject of illegal abortion. 162 In 1916 the Royal College of 
~hysicians passed and published resolutions concerning the dut i es of 
medical practitioners which included advice to the doctor to urge the 
patient to make a statement against the person who had performed an 
illegal operation. However, in the event of her refusal to do so , the 
doctor was under no legal obligation to take further act i on. 
In Australia a doctor must use his or her own judgement as to whether 
he should disclose information to the police about a ser i ous crimi nal 
offence that has been committed. In Queensland , howeve r , the 
obligation of the attending doctor in such instances a r e la i d down 
by statute. 163 Except in Queens 1 and, therefore , there i s no duty to 
disclose information to the police in Australia . 
The Code indicates no duty to disclose information of th is nature -
it merely allows disclosure. This confirms the pos i t i on pr i or to th e 
Code. 
(b) Child abuse 
The reporting of child abuse is discussed here as an except i on to the 
rule against disclosure under subrule (2)(i) of rule 11, but subrule 
(2)(d)(ii) 164 could also apply, namely "to prevent or lessen a 
serious and imminent threat to the life and health of the i nd i vi dual 
Rice v Connolly [1966) 2 QB 414 [1964) 2 Al l ER 649 . 
Above n 38 , 99 . 
Above n 49 , 1 0 1 . 
See above part VII C 1 . 
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concerned ... " The reason for this is that child abuse is usually an 
ongoing process. An offence has al ready been committed when the 
doctor detects it, and is more than likely to continue. 
Subrule (2)(i) makes it clear that a doctor may disclose such 
information without breaching the Code. Once again subrule (3) must 
be adhered to, namely that the disclosure is permitted, only to the 
extent necessary for the particular purpose. A doctor would therefore 
disclose such information only to the appropriate authorities. 
Section 15 of the Children, Young Persons and Their Families Act 1989 
allows "any person who believes that any child or young person has 
been, or is likely to be, harmed (whether physically, emotionally or 
sexually), ill-treated, abused, neglected, or deprived" to disclose 
information in this regard to a social worker or member of the 
police. Section 16 gives protection to those people who disclose such 
information from civil, criminal or disciplinary proceedings. 
In December 1993 the NZMA commented indirectly upon the temporary 
Code165 by submitting a draft version of a privacy code which might 
be suitable for medical practitioners. 166 Originally the NZMA was 
informed that it could develop its own code to be endorsed by the 
Commissioner. This alternative code was, however, ultimately declined 
by the Commissioner. 167 In this alternative code the NZMA suggested: 
Where a doctor has reasonable grounds to suspect ill treatment or neglect of 
a child, and the care giver, whether the doctor's patient or not, fails to act 
responsibly in the particular situation to protect the child, the doctor 
should 1 68 report to a soc i a 1 worker or the po 1 ice any i 11 treatment of a 
child that comes to the doctor's notice without breaching the privacy of the 
Code . 
The temporary code was replaced by the Health Information Privacy Code 1994 in 
late 1994. See above part I . 
"Privacy - A Code of Practice for Medical Practitioners" . 
Letter from NZMA Executive Officer, Jason Dowse, addressed to Louise Freyer, 31 
March 1995. 
Emphasis added. 
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The NZMA's opinion that doctors ought to report child abuse is merely 
that - an opinion. There is no statutory provision which compels such 
disclosure. Likewise the Code does not indicate any duty to disclose, 
and this confirms the statutory169 and common law position in New 
Zealand. 170 
2 Disclosure for the conduct of proceedings before any court or 
tribunal 
The exception in subrule 2(i)(ii) sanctions the disclosure of 
information necessary for the conduct of court or tribunal 
proceedings. This subrule is not inconsistent with the common law 
rule that doctors can be compelled to give in evidence information 
they acquire in confidence from their patients. However, both these 
rules are subject to the statutory exceptions (of "medical 
privilege") which are contained in sections 32, 33 and 35 of the 
Evidence Amendment Act ( No 2) 1980. 171 
F Drug Abusers 
Subrule (2)(j) deals with the situation where an individual is or is 
likely to become dependent upon some drug or prescribed medicine. 
Such information may be disclosed (only) by a registered health 
professional 1n to a Medical Officer of Health for the purposes of 
section 20 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1975 or section 49A of the 
Medicines Act 1981. It would then be the officer's task to alert 
other people, such as the police, pharmacists, hospitals and 
jails. 173 
S 15 of the Children, Young Persons and Their Families Act 1989, mentioned above . 
See above part VII D 2. 
See above part VIC 1. 
Above n 56. 
K Scherer "Doctors able to alert others to suspected addicts" in Health 
Information & Privacy in New Zealand 79. 
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Prior to the Code there was a well-established, but certainly not 
publicly known, custom that doctors and pharmacists "spread the word" 
among themselves whenever there was a suspected drug abuser in the 
neighbourhood. 174 The suspected drug abuser may enter the pharmacy 
first with a prescription, and the pharmacist may be the one to 
initiate the disclosure of information, or it may be a doctor whom 
the drug abuser has approached for a prescription who alerts other 
doctors and pharmacists. This discreet, grape-vine procedure was 
effective in preventing the situation where a drug abuser collected 
a number of scripts from a number of different (and possibly 
unsuspecting) doctors. 
This custom breaches the Code because the disclosure is not to a 
Medical Officer of Health. 175 In order to disclose this information 
to a person other than a Medi ea 1 Officer of Hea 1th, doctors and 
pharmacists will have to meet the requirements of rule 3(1)(c), 
namely that the individual be made aware of the intended recipients 
of the information. The commentary to the Code suggests that doctors 
and pharmacists display warning notices to this effect on their 
premises. 176 It is doubtful that many doctors or pharmacists would 
wish to put up such notices, and the custom described above 1s 
probably still practised and is likely to continue. Such a breach of 
the Code is a minor one, in so far as the disclosure may be directly 
to other health professionals who may be potential health providers 
of the suspe~ted drug abuser, instead of to the Medical Officer of 
Health. It wi 11 have to be seen how the Privacy Commissioner wi 11 
deal with a complaint in this regard. It is suggested that such a 
breach will possibly be dismissed as being one to which the Roman 
law maxim, "de minimis non curat lex", applies. 
The source of this information is confidential . 
S 22 F of the Health Act 1956 does not apply either, namely that information may 
be disclosed to a person who is providing or is about to provide health or 
di sabi 1 i ty services to the ; ndi vi dual . With the "grape-vine" procedure, the 
disclosure is made prophylactically, in case the suspected drug abuser should 
approach another health provider . 
Commentary to the Code 33 . 
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VIII REMEDIES 
A Remedies under the Privacy Act 1993 77 
A code of practice under the Privacy Act is a legal document. The 
statutory basis for codes of practice is found in Part VI of the 
Privacy Act. It is enforceable through the Privacy Commissioner and 
the Complaints Review Tribunal (although not usually through the 
ordinary courts).178 Part VIII of the Privacy Act deals with 
complaints regarding breaches of information privacy principles 
179and breaches of a code of practice. 180 A breach of the Code is 
an action which represents an interference with the privacy of an 
individual. The following requirements must be met: 181 
In the opinion of the Commissioner or the Tribunal , the act i on 
(i) Has caused, or may cause, loss, detriment , damage , or in j ury to 
that individual; or 
(ii ) Has adverse 1 y affected, or may adverse 1 y affect the r i ghts , 
benefits, privileges, obligations , or interests of that i ndiv i dua l; or 
(iii) Has resulted in, or may result in, sign i ficant humi li ation , 
significant loss or dignity , or s i gnificant i njury to the f eeli ngs of 
that individual. 
A complaint is first lodged, orally or in writing, 182 with the 
Privacy Commissioner, who investigates the complaint to see whether 
it has any substance. The role of the Privacy Commissioner is 
intended to be a conciliatory one183 and he wi 11 therefore try to 
reach an agreed settlement between the parties. If no settlement is 
P Toft "Privacy Act Complaints Procedures" in Prjvacy : New Zealand 47-51 . 
Office of the Privacy Commissioner "Guidance Note on Codes of Pract i ce under Part 
VI of the Privacy Act" (5 December 1994) in Pr;vacy : New Zealand 2 2 1 . 
S 66(a)(i) . 
S 66(a)(ii) . 
S 66(b)(i)-(iii); see also Office of the Privacy Commissioner, Fact sheet no. 6 
Complaints. 
S 68( 1). 
S 69(1 )(b). See above n 101, 106 . 
184 
185 
186 
187 
188 
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reached, the matter is referred to the Proceedings Commi ssi oner184 
who wi 11 refer the case to the Complaints Review Tribunal. If the 
Privacy Commissioner has refused to investigate a complaint, the 
complainant may bring proceedings before the Complaints Review 
Tribunal himself. 185 If the Complaints Review Tribunal is satisfied 
on a balance of probabilities that there was an interference with the 
privacy of an individual and the requirements set out above have been 
satisfied, it has the power to grant any one or more of the following 
remedies: declarations; restraining orders; orders requiring certain 
actions to be taken to put things right; and damages up to 
$200, OOO. 186 
The Privacy Act 1993 therefore enables an individual to be awarded 
damages for 1) pecuniary loss suffered as a result of a breach of the 
Code, 2) the loss of monetary or non-monetary benefit whi eh the 
i nd i vi dual might reasonably have been expected to obtain if the 
breach had not occurred, and 3) humiliation and injury to 
feelings . 187 
It is still possible for a person to bring a common law action in a 
civil court188 , but this option is not likely to be taken now that 
the Privacy Act has made it easier and less expensive to obtain 
redress for damages or detriment suffered as a result of the unlawful 
disclosure of health information. 
B Remedies prior to the Privacy Act 1993 
It is said that in the area of privacy there has not traditionally 
S 82 . 
S 88 . 
Commentary to Code 37. 
GE Everard "Health Information and the Privacy Act 1993" (1994) Patient Management 
104. 
See above part VI D 7 . 
189 
190 
191 
192 
193 
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been a remedy for the aggrieved individual for interferences with 
privacy. 189 Prior to the Privacy Act and the Code, if a doctor 
breached medical confidentiality, an individual could (and st i ll can 
after the enactment of the Code190 ) lodge a complaint with the 
secretary of the Medical Practitioners Disciplinary Committee191 or 
the secretary of the Medical Council of New Zealand1~ so that the 
complaint could be considered by the Medical Practitioners 
Disciplinary Committee193 . This could result in disciplinary action 
against the doctor, but offered no remedy for the complainant. The 
other option would have been a civil action for breach of duty of 
care, breach of contract, an action of negligence, or an action of 
invasion of privacy. However, the expense and difficulty involved i n 
suing someone in a civil action meant that, in effect, there was no 
remedy for most people who had suffered damage or detriment as the 
result of an unlawful disclosure of "health informat i on" . 
It is for these reasons that one can say that the opportunity which 
the Code affords an aggrieved person to obtain redress for an 
unlawful disclosure of what is now called "health information " i s the 
most significant difference which has been made to the law relating 
to this kind of disclosure. 
IX CONCLUSION 
This paper has endeavoured to show how rule 11 of the Code relates 
to the law regarding "medical confidentiality" (referring to the duty 
Above n 4 , 2 9 . 
The Medical Practitioners Bill, which was introduced to Parliament by th e Mi n i st er 
of Health in November 1994 , sets out new provisions with regard t o th e existing 
procedures for the disciplining of medical practitioners . These prov i s i ons ar e 
linked to the complaints procedures in the Health and Di sab i lity Commissi on e r Act 
1994 . See B Yeoman "Peer review in the Medical Profession " LLM Seminar VUW , August 
1995, 6 . 
Medical Practitioners Act 1968 s 42A(1) . 
Medical Practitioners Act 1968 s 55(1) . 
The new Medical Practitioners Bill proposes that a complaint wi ll be c onsidered 
by the Medical Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal (clause 91) . 
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of doctors and other health workers not to disclose confidential 
health-related information about individuals to third parties) as it 
existed prior to the Privacy Act and the Code. 
It is concluded that rule 11 reflects the common law as it existed, 
and still does, in New Zealand. The paper has shown that the common 
law has not been superseded and that any other statutory provisions 
authorising or requiring disclosure of health information overrides 
the provisions of the Privacy Act and the Code. 
The Code has, however, made a few additions to the law, and filled 
sma 11 gaps that existed. Firstly, the scope of persons to whom the 
duty of confidentiality with regard to "health information" applied, 
has been widened. Secondly, the scope of information which would 
previously have been regarded as confidential in a medical/health 
context has also been increased. Thirdly, a twenty year limitation 
has been added to the disclosure of information concerning deceased 
individuals. 
The Code affords children the same rights of privacy as adults. The 
common law and statutory provisions with regard to the rights of 
children are at present rather confusing, and the Code has 
regretfully added to the confusion by offering no clear guidelines 
as to when young children's wishes may override the decisions of 
parents and representatives. 
The most important exception to the rule against disclosure, namely 
disclosure in the public interest, where there is a serious and 
imminent threat to the health or life of a person or persons, as set 
out in rule 11(2)(d), enunciates only permission to disclose, but no 
duty. This omission is deliberate and echoes the uncertainty which 
currently exists in the common law in New Zealand as to whether there 
is a duty to act positively to prevent harm to a third party. 
In spite of not making significant changes to the law itself, the 
Code has made a considerable difference. The rules with regard to 
privacy of health information have been clearly defined and set out 
53 
in the Code for those working with such information and who may not 
previously have known with certainty what the law was and whether it 
applied to them. Even more important is the fact that the Code 1s 
backed by the complaints procedure of the Privacy Act which affords 
an aggrieved person the opportunity to obtain redress for any 
interference of privacy which he or she has suffered as a result of 
a breach of the Code. Prior to the Privacy Act and the Code there may 
have been many incidents of unlawful disclosure of "health 
information" which had no consequences. Now such a disclosure i_s 
classified as a breach of the Code and there is a remedy at hand for 
an aggrieved individual. 
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APPENDIX: Rule 11 of the Health Information Privacy Code 1994 
Limits on Disclosure of Health Information 
1 I 1 ,\ lic,1ltl, ,Jgcncy I hJl hold, hc,tllh 1nlon11, .. tion mu:,;l 11 01 d1,du,, t h,· 
111(111 111.1t11111 un l<'i-~ the <1~c>ncy lx-1,cvc>s, on rcusonahlc ~rounds 
1a1 th .11 the d1~clo:--urc , ._ Lo 
<1) ll a• 11 1d1vu1ua l cunccn1t•d, ur 
111 1 till' rnd 1v1dual's rcprC~<'fllJL1v~· wlwrc the 1nd1\·1dual 1:- di•,ui m ,, 
t111; 1hlc Lo <'Xt.·rc1i-c his or lll'r 111,:hLc: under tla•:,;c rulr,. 
1h 1 th;1t lhc·d1:-.cln:-.urc ,., JUlhori,t.·d I)\ 
thr 111d1\'1du.1I concerned, or 
1111 thl• 1nd1v1du;il's rcprc~nlatn·(' \\here the 1nd1v1dual ,s dt.•ad ur ,, 
u,rnUI<> to gwc h1, or her authonty under Llus rule, 
tcJ th.Jt the disclosure of the ,nformauon 1s one of the purpo:;es ,n 
conncct1on with which the 1nformat1on was obt.aincd, 
fdl that thl' source oflhe 1nfonnal1on 1s a publicly available publicaL1on, 
<el Lha l Lhe 1nformal1on 1s 1nfonnat1on 1n general lerms concern1nc Lhe 
presence. local1on. ttnd cond1L1on and progress of the pal1ent 1n a 
hospital, on the day on which the 1nformat1on 1s dtscloc;cd, and the 
disclosure 1s nol conlrary to lhe exp ress request of the 10d1v1dual or h1s 
or her represcntau,•c, or 
(fl that lhc infomullon to be disclosed concerns only the fact of death and 
the disclosure 1s hy a registered health professional, or by a person 
authorised by a health agency, to a person nominated by the md1v1dual 
concerned, or the ind1v1dual's representati ve. partner, spouse, pnnc1pal 
ca rcg1,·cr. next of kin, whanau, close relttt1ve or olher person whom 1t 1s 
rcason;1ble 1n the CJ.rcumsLances to inform 
l11 Compliance with parai::raph ( 1 ;<bl 1s not necessary 1f the health agency 
hchC'\"('S on rC'asonabl<' grounds that 1t 1s e ither not desirable or not 
pran1cablc lo obt:11n authorisation from the 1nd1v1dual concerned ,1nd 
tal that th(' disclo!-.ur(' of lhe information 1s directly related to one of thC' 
purpo~cs 111 connection w1lh which the 1nformat1on was obtained. 
1h1 th,1t the 1nfornwt1on ,s disclosed by a registered health professional to 
a person nom1natC'd l>y the 1nd1vidual concerned or to lhe principal 
caref!1v<'r or a near relall\"e of the 1nd1v1dual concerned 10 accord:inc<· 
(d 
with recognised professional practice and the disclosure 1s not contrary 
to Ute ekpres::. n ..  -quC.'-l of t he 1nd1v1dual or his or her representative, 
thal the 111format11111 
(11 1s Lo I.le u,l•d 111 tt fo1m 111 which the 1nd1v1du,1\ c1111ccr1H'd 1~ nut 
1dcnllfi1•rl, 
1111 1~ to Ix• u~c..-d for st•ll1..;tu.al pu,po,-cs ,111rl w ill not he puhlisl11 .. -d in 
a form th;1t cou ld n..',H,on.il>ly tx, CXpt..'CtC'd Lo 1dent1fy the 11H.i l\• 1du;d 
concernc...'<i, or 
(1 111 1s Lo be ui.ed for reseMch purpo:-.es (for wluch approvHI bv an 
ethics comm1lt('(', tf required, has l,ccn J...'lVt'I\) and will 1H1t l>c 
publtslwd in II form which could reasonably l>e exp<..'Ct..cd to 
1dcnllfy the 111d1v1durd concerned. 
(d I that the disclosure of the 1n format1on 1s necessary to pre!\'ent or lessen 
a. senous llnd 11nnuncnl thr('al to 
Ctl public hettlth or public safety, or 
(111 the life or health of the 111d1v1dual concerned o r anoth('I' 
ind1v1dual, 
(el that the disclosure of the 1nformat1on 1s essential to fac1htate the sale 
or other d1 spos1t1on of a business as a going concern; 
(0 that the infonnat.ion to be disclosed bnefly describes only the nature of 
injunes of an individual sustained in an accident and that individua..l'~ 
identity and the disclosure is· 
(i) by a person authorised by the person in charge of a hospital ; 
(iii to a person authorised by the person in charge of a news medium, 
for the purpose of publication or broadcast in connection with the news 
activities of that news medium and the disclosure is not contrary to the 
express request of the individual concerned or his or her representative, 
q;J that the d1sclo.!:urc of thC' 1nform:it1on 
11 I 1s required for the purpose~ of 1dC'nt1f)1ni:; .... ·hetht'r an md1\'1dual 
1s su itable to Ix> 1n\'olvC'd in health education and 50 th,11 
1nd1v1duals so 1dc>ntified nrnv he abl(' to be contacl.Cd to seek lhC'1r 
authority 1n accordanc(' with para,::-raph l l llbl. and 
11 11 1s by a person nuthonsed by the health agenc~ to a pt.·r~on 
authorised by :.i hen Ith tra1n1ni:: insl1tut1on. 
1 hi that the d1~clo!'-ure of the 1nformat1on 
111 1!'- r('qu1red for th(' purpos(' of a profo!<.~1onall,y rccoJ.!111,di 
accred1tat1on of a health or d1~ab1htv service. 
f111 1s rcqu1n-<l for a profc~!.1on.1lh· rC'Cocm,C'd t.'\t('rnal qu.1\11\ 
;1~,urance proi;r.unm<•, or 
11111 1s requ1r<'d for risk. mnn;1cemC'nt nsscssm('nl and Liu.• d1sclo.:-ur,· 
1s so]('I) Lo a per!-on eni:;aced by th(' acenc\' for the purpoc:<' of 
as~essmg th<' ag:enc~··s nsk, 
and the 111forn1at1on will nol t>e published tn a form wluch co, 
reasonably be expected to 1dent1fy any 1ndn11dual nor disclosed by 1 
accrcd1talton or quality assurance or nsk managem<'nl organ1sut1011 
third parties CXCC'pC 85 rt.·quircd by law, 
(1 I that non-compliance 1s nc..'Cessary 
IJI 
Id to avoid pn'Jud1ce Lo the nuuntcnann.' of th<' l;1w hr ,111\' pult 
SL'Clor a~ency, 1nclud1nc the prevention. delcclion , 1nn:.sllj.!•1l1u 
prosecution and punishment of offences, or 
(11) for the conduct of proccedints before an~· court ur tniJunal ll.,,;.•11 
proceed,ncs that have been commenced or arc rea,on,,blv 
cont.cmplal1unl, 
tlutl the 111d1v1dual concerned 1,;; or 1s likely to become d('penJcnt u1>, 
;t controlled drug, prescnpt1on medicine or restnctcd medicine and tl 
d1sclosur<> is by a reg-1stcred health profcss1011~1I Lo a Medical Orftct•r • 
Heil Ith for t!J(' purpos<'s of~('ct1on 20 ofth(' M1 c:.u,;;c of Drut.:5 Act 197!'"11 
section 49A of the Ml'd1c1nes Act 1981. or 
1 k, that th<> disclosure of the 1nfonnal1on 1s in accordance w1lh .i 
authonty granted und~r section 54 of the Act 
(3) Disclosure under subrule (2) 1s pcrm1tt.ed only to the extent ncccssa? for Ll 1 
particular purposc 
(4) \\11.ere under section 22f'(l) of the Health Act 1956. the md1v1dual concerne, 
or a representative of that md1v1dual requests the disclosure of healt. 
10format1on t.o that 10d1v1dual or representative, a health agency 
(51 
(61 
(al must treal anv request by tha:. ind1v1dual as if 1l wer(' a hcaltl 
1nformat1on pn'vacy requesl made under rule 6, and 
fbJ may refu!.t.' to d1sclosc information lo Lhe representative if 
1,1 the disclosure of the information would be contrary LO tlH 
md1v1dual's interests, 
f n ) the agency has reasonable grounds for believing that dw 
mdtvidual docs not or would not wish the 1nformat1on to I.>(, 
disclosed, or 
1111) th('re would be good grounds for w1thhold1ng the 1nformat1on 
under Part IV of the Act 1f the request had been made b) the 
md1v1dual concerned 
This rule applies LO health 1nformatJon about hwng or deceased per~ni-
obt.ained before or aft.er the commencement of this code 
Notwithstanding subrule t5l thts rule applies LO health 1nformalt~n ;bou} 
any identifiable deceased person, for not more than 20 years after t e ay 0 
that person's death 
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